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Competition Policy’s Social Paradox: Are We Losing Sight of the Wood for the 
Trees? 
Anca D Chirita 
Assistant Professor of Competition Law, Durham University (UK), Dr. iur. (Saarbrücken); Non-
Governmental Adviser to the International Competition Network for the European Commission’s 
Directorate-General for Competition 
ABSTRACT 
The present contribution seeks to provide a normative justification for the better consideration of 
employment and its negative social consequences in the area of mergers. First, it challenges the 
widespread rhetoric of competition policy when advancing economic efficiency as a goal of 
competition policy. Second, it argues that the promotion of efficiency-driven, fierce competition 
comes at the expense of other sensible social values, such as job creation. As evidenced by statistics, 
this contribution unravels how job cuts follow from mergers and acquisitions. It argues (i) in favour 
of an overhaul of the efficiency defence with the aim of focusing more actively on job creation, or at 
least on balancing the number of job cuts with the number of newly created jobs and (ii) against 
anti-competitive practices such as social dumping and camouflage. 
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I. Introduction 
The present contribution seeks to provide a normative justification for the better consideration of 
employment and its social consequences in the area of mergers. First, it challenges the widespread 
rhetoric of competition policy when advancing economic efficiency as a goal of competition policy. 
Second, it argues that the promotion of efficiency-driven, fierce competition comes at the expense of 
other sensible social values, such as job creation. Modern competition policy is based on a flawed 
assumption about how markets work in practice. It believes that by promoting efficiency, inefficient 
businesses will always leave the market. This policy, however, reveals its own fallacy. The exit of 
larger, or the merger of smaller businesses, is often associated with their downsizing or 
restructuring and, as a result, with job losses. A dogmatic application of competition policy serving 
economic calculus, rather than the social order, has silently ignored the negative impact of fierce 
competition on wages and employment.  
Over the past many years of successful enforcement of competition laws, no attempts have been 
made to reverse the negative social impact that has been inflicted by aggressive forms of 
competition. One way of curbing this negative impact could be through job creation; for example, in 
lieu of corporate fines for breaches of competition rules, a reduction could be offered based on the 
number of jobs that are newly created or the ‘public interest’ clause could be activated more often. 
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By revisiting the classical concepts of ‘price efficiency’ and ‘wage efficiency’ and their theoretic 
assumptions, this contribution goes on to challenge the use of the ‘efficiency’ benchmark at both 
micro- and macroeconomic levels. The study of mergers and acquisitions, known as ‘M&A’, across 
several sectors of the economy seeks to demonstrate how internal growth and merger-specific 
efficiencies – some of which include the elimination of labour costs – have a negative impact on both 
wages and employment prospects. While 6.5% out of 3.7 million jobs losses as a result of M&A 
activity during a four-year period did not create a major macroeconomic imbalance, a closer look at 
recent M&A trends during 2013-2016 demonstrates that, indeed, job losses far outweigh the balance 
of job creation. In this respect, this contribution fills a gap in the scant literature on the impact of 
M&A activity on social welfare. 
Ultimately, if economic efficiency always translates into the destruction of jobs, why should it, 
then, be afforded such a prominent role in modern competition policy rhetoric? Therefore, this 
contribution challenges the well-established assumption that ‘new jobs replace old jobs’ following a 
successful merger. This assumption is basically at odds with the fact that the majority of European 
Union (EU) mergers are approved, even if subject to conditions, leaving an insignificant percentage 
of mergers blocked since 1990 (27 or 0.38%).  
As evidenced by statistics, this contribution unravels how job cuts follow from mergers. It argues 
(i) in favour of an overhaul of the efficiency defence with the aim of focusing more actively on job 
creation, or at least on balancing the number of job cuts with the number of newly created jobs, and 
(ii) against anti-competitive practices, such as social dumping and camouflage. There is yet another 
significant gap in the interdisciplinary literature on the intersection of competition policy and 
employment theories.1  
A particularly under-researched area in competition law is the link between efficiency-driven, i.e., 
fierce competition, and its social impact on employment in the form of job losses or austerity. Job 
losses have been pursued in the name of efficiency with the aim of curbing public governmental debt, 
and austerity has ultimately brought about job cuts, which subsequently discourages public 
spending and consumption. Efficiency-driven, fierce competition has been tempered by attempting 
to integrate labour economics into competition policy. Although recent competition policy rhetoric 
refers to a ‘highly competitive social market economy’, its social feature remains an elusive 
                                                          
1 The current disciplinary divide between micro-and macroeconomics has been best portrayed by Greenwald and Stiglitz as follows: ‘The 
schizophrenia to which Keynesian economics gave rise was reflected in the way economics was taught: micro-economic courses, in which 
students were introduced to Adam Smith’s invisible hand and the fundamental theorems of welfare economics, were followed by macro-
economic courses, focusing on the failures of the market economy and the role of the government in correcting them. Two disciplines 
developed, with micro-economists looking upon the (lack of) rigor of the macro-economists, and denigrating the lack of theoretical 
foundations, while macro-economists castigated micro-economists for the obvious inappropriateness of their theories’, in Bruce Greenwald 
and Joseph E. Stiglitz, ‘Keynesian, New Keynesian and New Classical Economics’ (1987) National Bureau of Economic Research Working 
Paper no. 2160, 3. As this contribution will demonstrate further, the ‘grand’ theories of both disciplines rest upon fundamentally flawed 
premises and often contradict each other or fail entirely in practice. 
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normative concept. The Treaty of Lisbon ambitiously seeks to meet a self-imposed, social target of 
‘full-employment’. The practicalities of the latter have been daunting. 
 
II. A Hidden Paradox: Achieving ‘Full Employment’ through Competition Policy? 
A hidden paradox has been the involvement of EU competition policy in the area of employment 
law, especially its active, or rather more passive, involvement in the delivery of Article 3’s (3) ‘highly 
competitive social market economy, aiming at full employment’. Understanding the social feature of 
competition policy is crucial for the concrete design of implementation tools with the help of which 
competition law could meet the social target of ‘full employment’. It is, therefore, necessary to 
explore how the ‘social’ market economy could reconcile its social feature with the prevalent focus 
on the efficiency-driven feature of fierce or aggressive competition. How could it be possible to 
embrace solidarity, which is a derived social value? The latter is the pathway towards the 
achievement of ‘full’ employment. It seeks to secure prosperity and well-being for the whole of 
society. In contrast, a ‘highly competitive’ market economy is the antithesis of the social feature. In 
other words, fierce competition inevitably triggers negative effects for social welfare. Therefore, the 
desire for fierce, efficiency-driven competition cannot be absolute, i.e., the most, but a highly 
competitive market economy. In this section, it is therefore argued that such a moderate balancing of 
efficiency-driven competition is precisely what serves the social feature of competition policy. In so 
doing, this balancing unleashes the hidden paradox mentioned above. 
The next research question, then, turns to whether the EU Treaty’s legal framework is indeed 
able to meet its projected target of full employment. Regarding this question, the present 
contribution argues that, although this projection appeared utopian for many years, it can still be 
achieved, following the aftermath of years of European austerity and the harm inflicted through job 
cuts.  
Unlike its predecessor, namely, the Treaty of Amsterdam’s ‘high level of employment’, the 
Treaty of Lisbon appeared too often to have more than missed its target of ‘full employment’. 
Towards this end, another factor has actively contributed, especially the missed unemployment 
targets from the ‘convergence’ criteria that are required to join the Eurozone.2  
Finally, the present contribution seeks to demonstrate how competition law can, and should, 
integrate a more pro-active focus on employment-friendly considerations by carefully revisiting the 
intentions of corporations willing to merge, which could unnecessarily reduce the number of 
existing jobs. Through a careful consideration and balancing of the commercial interests of the 
merging parties, in particular their employment targets vis-à-vis newly created jobs and avoidance 
of unnecessary job cuts, competition law can successfully implement a social policy that effectively 
curbs the negative impact of fierce and aggressive competition and long-term austerity. 
                                                          
2 See, e.g., Anca D Chirita, ‘The Impact of the EU Crisis on Law, Policy and Society’ (2014) 16 Cambridge Yearbook of European Legal 
Studies, 270. 
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A. Why Utopian ‘Full Employment’ is better than Dystopian Efficiency-Driven Fierce 
Competition 
This sub-section argues that even utopian ‘full employment’ is better than dystopian efficiency-
driven, fierce competition. First, fierce competition disguised as competitiveness, coupled with an 
increased pressure to cut down on public spending through austerity, has had negative effects on 
social welfare. Aggressive forms of job competition, i.e., employment-based competition, have led to 
a perpetual state of insecurity. Second, a reconciliation of ‘full employment’ with efficiency-driven 
competition is the key to achieving the highly desirable social market economy. Third, a swinging 
pendulum of perpetual job insecurity through an invisible anti-competitive practice of social 
camouflage, i.e., newly created jobs that do not add up to the number of existing ones, or replacing 
older (costly) with younger (cheaper) employees ahead of the retirement age in the name of 
efficiency, is purely dystopian. It is, therefore, argued that the above anti-competitive practice 
pursued by corporations in the name of industrial organization efficiency should be banned. The 
European scholarship offers further support regarding labour law as a form of market regulation of 
‘transnational competition’, which is subordinate to competition law.3  
B. Putting ‘Full Employment’ into Context 
From the outset, the Treaty of Rome presented an awkward imbalance between social and economic 
goals, which has been attributed to the German neo-liberal model of economic governance.4 For the 
latter, social values can be built only on the solid economic foundations of an internal market. It is 
thought that social goals could be achieved solely through economic growth, which emerges 
following a successful integration of national markets. An obvious flaw of this approach to ‘economic 
governance’ has been to prioritise economic over social goals.5 This has led to inherent tensions 
between competition and labour law, the latter being subject to judicial review in the name of 
efficiency and market freedoms.6 
                                                          
3 See Simon Deakin, ‘Labour Law as Market Regulation: The Economic Foundations of European Social Policies’ in Paul Davies, Antoine 
Lyon-Caen, Spiros Simitis and Silvana Sciarra (eds.), European Community Labour Law: Principles and Perspectives (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 
1996), 63-94; Stefan Giubboni, ‘The Rise and Fall of EU Labour Law’ 24 (2018) European Law Journal, 9, who refers to the autonomy of 
labour law from competition law to prevent social law from being de-regulated; national labour laws are subject to the judicial review 
before European courts in terms of necessity, adequacy, and proportionality, 12; for the concept of transnational solidarity, see Floris de 
Witte, Justice in the EU: The Emergence of Transnational Solidarity (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015), 38; on the subordination of 
social policy to the wider goal of improved economic performance, see Simon Deakin and Frank Wilkinson, ‘Social policy and economic 
efficiency: The deregulation of the labour market in Britain’ (1991) Critical Social Policy, 40. 
4 Stefan Bernhard, ‘From Conflict to Consensus: European Neoliberalism and the Debate on the Future of EU Social Policy’ (2010) 4 
Work Organisation, Labour & Globalisation 1, 177. 
5 Ibid. 182. 
6 Against the subordination of labour law to market freedoms, see cf Giubboni, (n 3), 13; Hans-Wolfgang Micklitz, ‘Judicial Activism of 
the European Court of Justice and the Development of the European Social Model in Anti-Discrimination and Consumer Law’ in Ulla 
Neergaard, Ruth Nielsen and Lynn Roseberry (eds.), The Role of the Courts in Developing a European Social Model (Copenhagen: DJǾF 
Publishing, 2010), 22; and for an anti-discrimination approach to labour law, see Catherine Barnard, ‘Fifty Years of Avoiding Social 
Dumping? The EU’s Economic and Not So Economic Constitution’ in Michael Dougan and Samantha Currie (eds.) 50 Years of the 
European Treaties: Looking Back and Thinking Forward (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2009), 322. 
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Neglecting social goals has made the integration of markets primarily based on anti-competitive 
practices, such as social dumping, camouflaging labour costs, and maintaining employment.7 For 
example, competing firms were forced to operate with lower wages to meet rival firms’ prices. 
Otherwise, firms offering higher wages would have been squeezed out of the market due to fierce 
competition based on dumping wages, or have been forced to re-locate elsewhere so as to be able to 
achieve an equivalent dumping wage.8 However, the phenomenon of losing well-paid jobs to cheaper 
workers from elsewhere had been recorded before, including protectionist slogans, such as ‘British 
jobs for British workers’.9 
All in all, such a social policy met the foremost economic ends of corporations and businesses 
alike, including industrial growth and competitiveness, by ‘adaptation’ to the labour market.10 The 
EU Commission recognised ‘labour market integration’ as ‘the key objective’, 11  which requires 
Member States to adapt their social policies ‘in order to make their economies more efficient’.12 
Unfortunately, competition based on cheaper labour has actively contributed to the acquisition, often 
from elsewhere, of highly skilled workers, known as ‘economic’ migrants. This form of social 
dumping has contributed towards a higher overall productivity and delivered economic efficiency.13 
With the Treaty of Amsterdam, social policy gained momentum to re-calibrate social over 
economic goals.14 Upon its entry into force, the Treaty endorsed a ‘high level’ of employment. 
However, it was not until the Treaty of Lisbon that a shift of perspective came to fruition with the 
explicit insertion of ‘full employment’. Nevertheless, this insertion remains an ideal, subject to 
unusual deviations, such as the financial crisis, public debt issues, or austerity cuts. In sharp contrast, 
the US affirms a ‘statutory commitment’ to full employment.15 In the EU, the Lisbon Strategy was 
the first to promote the positive interaction between economic and social policy and to focus on 
                                                          
7  These practices are often achieved through unlawful discrimination and harassment of existing employees, see Sandra Fredman, 
Discrimination Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2nd ed., 2011), 109. On the German consensus against social dumping, see John 
Grahl and Paul Teague, ‘Reconstructing the Eurozone: The Role of EU Social Policy’ (2013) 37 Cambridge Journal of Economics, 681. 
8 See, e.g., Stephan Leibfried and Paul Pierson, ‘European Social Policy’ (1999) 15 ZeS-Arbeitspapier, Zentrum für Sozialpolitik, 30. 
9 See, e.g., Peter Clarke, Keynes: The Twentieth Century’s Most Influential Economist (London: Bloomsbury Publishing, 2009), 115; for the 
unemployment context, see, e.g., Nicholas Wapshott, Keynes Hayek: The Clash That Defined Modern Economics (New York: W.W. Norton, 
2012), 56 and 145, for the social situation in the UK in 1929, where 1.34 million were unemployed, i.e., one in ten, reaching a peak of 23% 
in January 1933. Keynes was critical of the Marshallian theory of equilibrium according to which a state of equilibrium will be reached 
where, in the long run, everyone will be employed, and ‘full employment’ will be met. As the theory did not cure the unemployment 
problem, Keynes advocated in favour of public spending remedies and of artificially lowering the interest rate, which triggered the 
criticism that such remedies would lead to inflation. Keynes responded to this criticism by famously saying that ‘in the long run we are all 
dead’, see 26, 31 and 43; on the problem of persistent long-term unemployment and the need for corrective action, see Roger E. 
Backhouse, ‘The Keynesian revolution’ in Roger E. Backhouse and Bradley W Bateman (eds.) The Cambridge Companion to Keynes 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), 21, 24. 
10 Bernhard (n 4), 188. 
11 EU Commission, ‘Concerning a consultation on action at EU level to promote an active inclusion of people furthest from the labour 
market’, COM (2006) 44 final. 
12 Ibid. 
13 Cf Giubboni (n 3), 13; against the current lax approach to social dumping where intervention against social dumping is seen as an 
‘obstacle to the freedom to provide a service’. 
14 See, e.g., Erika Szyszczak, ‘Social Policy’ (2001) 50 International & Comparative Law Quarterly, 182. 
15 See Alex Callinicos, ‘Commentary: Contradictions of Austerity’ (2012) 36 Cambridge Journal of Economics, 70. 
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employment.16 The Strategy projected a social model of sustainable development, which aimed at 
raising the living standards of all citizens in the EU. Through a combination of economic growth 
with social cohesion, it was hoped to achieve the highly competitive social market economy. 
The EU social model17 embraces several core values, such as social welfare, solidarity, equality of 
opportunity, and collective bargaining. Due to the usual constraints of space, the present 
contribution focuses primarily on labour costs and employment theories. It remains silent on issues 
pertaining to the protection of individual workers or, more generally, on labour standards.  
Ultimately, this contribution argues that a dynamic interpretation of social rights as fundamental 
rights requires that social rights be prioritised over the pursuit of economic efficiency. 
C. Leaving Egocentric Efficiency Behind? 
Article 3 TEU has certainly projected a much better social governance model that stands for 
solidarity, social justice, and equality. The ‘social’ market economy imposes certain economic 
limitations and restraints upon the desire for greater competitiveness, i.e., a ‘highly competitive’ 
market economy. However, can the social feature of the market economy be reconciled with fierce 
competitiveness, and could egocentric efficiency be left behind? So far, many citizens have felt rather 
left behind by the negative effects inflicted through social dumping, camouflaged labour costs, and 
long-term austerity. 
Comparatively, if one looks to the German model of a social market economy, the latter allows 
state intervention to ensure economic efficiency and full employment.18 At the heart of its social 
model of governance is the maintenance of competition in the presence of economic conditions 
favourable to full employment. This status quo has facilitated a wider economic participation, 
including in the distribution of income.19 Safeguarding a minimum income and the principle that 
individual losses cannot be socialised are other stronger features of the German model of economic 
governance. 20  In contrast, in the EU, social goals remain subordinate to economic goals. For 
example, Article 3 (3) TEU’s mandate ‘for the sustainable development’ of Europe based on 
‘balanced economic growth’ and ‘price stability’ offers a clear nexus between economic growth and 
social development.21 However, Article 127 TFEU’s economic goal of achieving price stability by 
fighting against inflation or deflation has been featured more prominently ahead of the social goal of 
achieving full employment. The present configuration relies on the premise that the maintenance of 
price stability through monetary intervention is a sine qua non for economic growth. Later, this will 
                                                          
16 EU Commission, ‘Joint Report on Social Protection and Social Inclusion 2005’, COMP (2005) 14 final. 
17 See the EU Commission, White Paper on Social Policy, COM (94) 333, para 3. 
18 Hans F. Zacher, ‘Social Market Economy, Social Policy, and the Law’ (1982) 138 Zeitschrift für die gesamte Staatswissenschaft/Journal 
of Institutional and Theoretical Economics 3, 373. 
19 Zacher (n 18), 376. 
20 Christine Wolfgramm and Ines Läufer, ‘Social Security Systems in the Social Market Economy’ in Christian L Glossner and David 
Gregosz (eds.) 60 Years of Social Market Economy: Formation, Development and Perspectives of a Peacemaking Formula (Sankt Augustin, Berlin: 
Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung e.V.), 132. 
21 See Catherine Barnard, ‘EU Employment Law and the European Social Model: The Past, the Present and the Future’ (2014) 67 Current 
Legal Problems, 203. 
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also create the economic conditions favouring full employment. However, Article 9 TFEU refers 
specifically to the promotion of a ‘high level’ of employment. The ‘high’ and ‘full’ levels of 
employment raise expectations that, to a certain extent, can only contradict each other. It is 
unreasonable to aim towards ‘full’ employment, i.e., under 5% unemployment rate, but, at the same 
time, aim towards a high level of employment, i.e., 60% or more. For example, a EU2020 target 
referred to a 75% employment rate among 20- to 64-year-olds. With an employment rate of 68.3%, 
2013 stood slightly below such an optimistic target.  
It has also been difficult to correct macroeconomic imbalances in the Eurozone. The fluctuation 
of inflation rates has had a similar impact on real interest rates. While a lower interest rate 
encouraged a period of economic boom, it later triggered the rise of inflation. The latter resulted in a 
lack of competitiveness compared to higher rates of interest coupled with a lower level of inflation.22 
For example, Spain lost its competitiveness due to a higher than expected public debt coupled with a 
depressive unemployment rate. 
Comparatively, if one looks to the Anglo-Saxon model of low unemployment with welfare 
benefits, the former is in sharp contrast to the continental model of high unemployment.23 During 
the 1970s and 1980s, following an extensive process of privatisation, monetarism replaced 
Keynesianism and efficiency-driven fierce competition the welfare state. 24  In contrast to its 
predecessor, the newly introduced model sacrificed labour while creating low-paid entry jobs or 
unpaid internships. Following dramatic reforms to its social benefits programme (Hartz IV), the 
German welfare model undercut unemployment benefits.25 In contrast, the Anglo-Saxon model of 
the welfare state did the same in recent years following the financial crisis and austerity measures. 
The latter measures inevitably affected the most vulnerable and unskilled workers. 
The novelty of the Anglo-Saxon model surfaced with the financialisation of services and 
increasing casualisation of labour. Again, the Anglo-Saxon model contrasted the flexible continental 
model.26 At least historically, especially during the 1950s and 1960s, the continental model offered 
better employment protection and unemployment compensation. In mainland Europe, tenured jobs 
contributed to the maintenance of lower unemployment rates.27 In contrast, the contemporary model 
of temporary, agency or ‘flexi’ work,28 or the casualisation of the hourly paid workers, has been 
short-sighted. Short-term employment has been based on aggressive forms of competition for jobs. 
The shortcoming of fierce competition based on lower wages driven by economic efficiency was a 
                                                          
22 See Christopher Adam, Paola Subacchi and David Vines, ‘International Macroeconomic Policy Coordination: An Overview’ (2012) 28 
Oxford Review of Economic Policy 3, 404-5. 
23 See Simon Deakin and Hannah Reed, ‘The Contested Meaning of Labour Market Flexibility: Economic Theory and the Discourse of 
European Integration’ in Jo Shaw (ed.), Social Law and Policy in an Evolving European Union (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2000). 
24 Lawrence King, Michael Kitson, Sue Konzelmann and Frank Wilkinson, ‘Making the Same Mistake Again –Or Is This Time Different?’ 
(2012) 36 Cambridge Journal of Economics, 8. 
25 Ibid., 684. 
26 Riccardo Bellofiore, ‘Two or Three Things I Know About Her’: Europe in the Global Crisis and Heterodox Economics’ (2013) 37 
Cambridge Journal of Economics, 501. 
27 See Lars Ljungqvist and Thomas J Sargent, ‘Two Questions about European Unemployment’ (2008) 76 Econometrica 1, 1-29. 
28 See Grahl and Teague (n 7), 683. 
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higher unemployment rate in the long run. The continuous decline of the social welfare state has 
gradually eroded social rights and employment protection and amplified job insecurity. However, 
fixed-term contracts are commonly employed by smaller and medium-sized firms. The latter have to 
overcome certain information asymmetries pertaining to their own employees. Following probation, 
even such firms should be more interested in open-ended, permanent contracts of employment. This 
is because hiring and subsequent training are more costly to employers. 
D. Major Obstacles on the Road to Full Employment 
Unemployment has been expounded as ‘the worse manifestation of pervasive market failures which 
arise in the presence of imperfect information and incomplete markets’.29 The major obstacles to full 
employment are first given by the brief study of the general causes of unemployment. To this end, 
several factors have been identified as leading to unemployment, including inter alia an excessive 
monetary expansion leading to inflation, labour market imperfections, state intervention, stronger 
trade unions, generous welfare benefits, lower employees’ performance, and motivation.30 
Keynes regarded unemployment as ‘the major social ill’ and proposed several remedies.31 Other 
commentators have argued that any governmental attempt to increase employment above the 
‘natural rate’ of employment, known as NAIRU, i.e., ‘non-accelerating inflation rate of 
unemployment’, 32  will cause inflation or job cuts elsewhere in the economy. 33  In turn, 
microeconomic theory assumes that businesses sell and buy all that they wish to supply and demand 
respectively at the prevailing wages and market prices.34 In contrast to Walrasian economics, wages 
are dictated by the bargaining power of the labour unions and larger firms, and are not the result of 
a market-clearing process. Were unemployment to fall below NAIRU, this could ultimately improve 
the bargaining position of workers. 35  While inflation triggers adverse effects, including 
unemployment, it can also increase demand. Due to widespread involuntary unemployment, it has 
been argued that the NAIRU analysis is inappropriate, as it is not labour, but a lack of aggregate 
demand that is responsible for unemployment.36 
                                                          
29 Greenwald and Stiglitz (n 1), 36. 
30 In addition, Hobson mentions moral and economic defects, such as ‘drink, laziness, inefficiency, or some other personal fault’, see, e.g., 
John E. Hobson, The Problem of the Unemployed: An Inquiry and an Economic Policy (London: Methuen, 1896), 47; thus, Hobson later argued 
that ‘individual character has little to do with the causes of labour problems’, see Michael S Lawlor, The Economics of Keynes in Historical 
Context: An Intellectual History of the General Theory (New York, Palgrave Macmillan, 2006), 52. 
31 Lawlor (n 30), 81; Lawlor refers to Keynes’ General Theory of Employment ‘a loose social theory of wages’, 86. 
32 See James Meade, Wage Fixing (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1982), vol. 1, 21 ff.; for Meade’s argument that employment policy 
required inter alia increased mobility of labour and willingness of industry to relocate, see George C. Peden, ‘Keynes and British economic 
policy’ in Backhouse and Bateman (n 9), 113. 
33 See, e.g., Milton Friedman, ‘Inflation and Unemployment: The New Dimension of Politics’, 1976 Alfred Nobel Memorial Lecture (1977) 
51 Occasional Paper of the Institute of Economic Affairs. 
34 Assar Lindbeck and Dennis J. Snower, ‘Explanations of Unemployment’ (1985) 1 Oxford Review of Economic Policy 2. 
35 Engelbert Stockhammer, Eckhard Hein and Lucas Grafl, ‘Globalization and the Effects of Changes in Functional Income Distribution 
on Aggregate Demand in Germany’ (2011) 25 International Review of Applied Economics 1, 298. 
36 See, e.g., John Cornwall, ‘Keynes? What Remains of’ in Thomas Cave (ed.) An Encyclopaedia of Keynesian Economics (Cheltenham: Edward 
Elgar, 2nd ed., 2013), 330. 
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A preliminary finding is that a higher rate of employment gives labour unions better bargaining 
power and eventually higher nominal wages. At this level of employment, but under inflationary 
conditions, the expected real wage is convergent with that one based on market prices dictated by 
oligopolistic firms. In order to achieve full employment, there is therefore not much of a choice left: 
either ‘higher’ or ‘lower’ real wages. The last option creates more jobs, whilst the first option is 
egocentric. 
E. The Quest for an Optimal Equilibrium between ‘High’ and ‘Full’ Employment 
The ultimate quest is for governments to establish an optimal equilibrium between high and full 
employment so that the harm caused by inflation does not outweigh the benefits stemming from an 
increase in employment. It has been suggested that, until unemployment becomes serious, it is 
possible to maintain a level of wages that could cover the living costs.37 Therefore, an ‘excess of 
wages’ beyond the basic living costs becomes close to a monopolistic mark-up, i.e., an excess of the 
market price over the marginal cost. In his famous book ‘The Wealth of Nations’, Adam Smith 
traced this perennial conflict apparent in the distribution of income: ‘The workmen desire to get as 
much, the masters to give as little as possible. The former are disposed to combine in order to raise, 
the later in order to lower the wages of labour’. 38  There is no better evidence of the close 
relationship between the macroeconomics of lower wages and the microeconomics of business 
efficiency. 
Other suggestions include monetary and fiscal policy, which could maintain adequate demand in 
order to make wages and prices behave as if they were determined by market forces. For instance, 
the Phillips curve identified the existence of an inverse relationship between employment and 
inflation.39 In other words, inflation became the necessary price to be paid for maintaining a high 
level of employment and competitive wages in the economy. This ambivalent relationship has been 
fully exploited by Marxian theory, according to which, by maintaining unemployment, capitalism is 
an inferior society to communism.40 The latter theory advanced a centrally planned economy where 
there is no unemployment, but wages are very low. Too much unemployment and inflation at the 
same time is known as stagflation. According to neo-Keynesians, stagflation is the response to the 
effect of raising direct taxes and import prices on the real wage of workers.41 Most revealing, 
however, is the correlation between market prices and wages, specifically, to maintain price stability, 
                                                          
37 See, e.g., Abba P Lerner, ‘Employment theory and employment policy’ (1964) 57 American Economic Review 2, 9. 
38 See, e.g., Adam Smith, An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations (London: W. Strahan, 1776), previously cited by 
Heinz D. Kurz, ‘Adam Smith on Markets, Competition and Violations of Natural Liberty’ (2015) Cambridge Journal of Economics, 21. 
39 Alban W. Phillips, ‘The Relation between Unemployment and the Rate of Exchange of Money Wages in the United Kingdom 1861 to 
1957’ (1958) 25 Economica 100, 283-99; Ekkehard Ernst and Uma Rani, ‘Understanding Unemployment Flows’ (2011) 27 Oxford Review 
of Economic Policy 2, 271. 
40 Lerner (n 37), 17. 
41 See Frank Wilkinson and HA Turner, ‘The Wage Tax Spiral and Labour Militancy’ in Dudley Jackson, HA Turner and Frank 
Wilkinson (eds.) Do Trade Unions Cause Inflation?: Two Studies: with a Theoretical Introduction and Policy Conclusion (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1972). 
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wages have to rise in line with marginal productivity.42 In other words, wages cannot be artificially 
raised above the normal competitive level.  
Hayek, too, examined another revealing correlation between wages and interest rates. Where 
producers make informed choices regarding the intensity of production, they need to consider the 
inverse relationship between interest rates and real wages.43 Otherwise, an artificial lowering of 
interest rates, in turn, could trigger a rise in real wages. Followed by the use of capital-intensive 
methods of production, producers will spend more on capital rather than consumption goods. 
F. What Role for Competition Policy: To Intervene or Not to Intervene? 
Neoclassical economics placed trust in the self-correcting mechanism of free competitive markets. 
Governmental intervention for lowering unemployment was, therefore, doomed to failure in the 
long run. 44  Neoliberal prescriptions of this kind tended to intensify competition through 
deregulation and privatisation and to maintain price stability and budgetary balance.45 In contrast, 
Keynesian economics held that free markets cannot guarantee the full utilisation of all available 
resources. In the name of economic efficiency and social justice, governments ought to intervene in 
the economy to eliminate ‘involuntary’ unemployment.46  
However, could governments intervene directly to correct all possible macroeconomic imbalances 
regarding unemployment? Indeed, competition policy could indirectly intervene. So far, competition 
policy has been active at the micro-economic level, ensuring inter alia that businesses behave 
rationally in setting the most efficient market price per unit of production. Could competition policy 
look further beyond microeconomics? So doing could include a macro-economic dimension by 
examining the cost of real wages. Could it, then, also question any unintended social consequences, 
namely, the manner in which wages could artificially distort price competition? For example, the 
‘supply-demand’ relationship between labour and employers is nothing but an unfortunate proxy 
that is incapable of addressing the market-price distortions created by artificial wages.47 Competition 
policy could also investigate more thoroughly a wider range of monopoly or oligopoly problems, 
namely, whether wages are raised above labour costs, or whether they do not fall below such costs. 
The latter situation aims to prevent an increase in the mark-up price.  
The way in which competition policy could correct macroeconomic imbalances of artificial wages 
through pro-active intervention at the microeconomic level of the firm remains another revelation 
that could shed light on the corrective mission of competition policy. 
As firms operate in imperfect markets, so prices are set with a mark-up over wage costs. For 
example, were trade unions to request an ‘artificial’ wage above the competitive wage under an 
                                                          
42 Lerner (n 37), 12. 
43 See, e.g., Marina Colonna, ‘Hayek on Money and Equilibrium’ (1990) 9 Contributions to Political Economy, 59. 
44 Dennis J. Snower, ‘Evaluating Unemployment Policies: What Do the Underlying Theories Tell Us?’ (1995) 11 Oxford Review of 
Economic Policy 4, 111. 
45  See Jean-Paul Fitoussi and Francesco Saraceno, ‘European Economic Governance: the Berlin-Washington Consensus’ (2013) 37 
Cambridge Journal of Economics, 480. 
46 Konzelmann (n 24), 730. 
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optimal equilibrium, employers could then attempt to address this concern by maintaining their 
corporate profits at the expense of higher prices to consumers.48 The latter could lead to inflated 
prices and, ultimately, unemployment; in particular, a central bank does not tolerate inflation. The 
way to break out of this vicious circle appears to be wage moderation. This is the safest option, 
especially where dismissal is feared and lower employment protection is in place. Equally, excessive 
wages could result in losing jobs to foreign competitors.49 
In light of all of the above arguments, it is questionable whether capitalism could still be able to 
adjust itself to full employment in the EU. Could capitalism achieve full employment subject to 
reforms?50 As will later be seen, despite notable success in achieving full employment in the UK and 
Germany, this is not the case in other Member States.  
Wage flexibility is yet another remedy being offered to resolve the unemployment problem.51 
Supporters of wage flexibility argue that, by reducing the costs of hiring and firing and those 
associated with unemployment insurance, the conditions of unemployment should be less 
generous. 52  Thus, such a wage/price adjustment could restore lost competitiveness, if only 
temporarily.53 However, it is not the ultimate cure. Similarly, using unemployment as a weapon to 
combat inflation may simply work the wrong way.54 In contrast, successful maintenance of full 
employment in the long run would yield a considerable social benefit to the society as a whole.  
Finally, a notable enemy of full employment is technological progress55 and the rise of robots and 
artificial intelligence (AI).56 The effects of the latter are currently under-estimated by economics. 
Although they could advance social progress, robots and AI could also elevate unemployment to 
levels never seen before. Workers could be left behind, i.e., marginalised, rather than co-opted to 
social progress, which would involve them receiving a decent wage for fewer hours of work. To 
Keynes, technological unemployment due to the ‘discovery of means of economising the use of 
labour’57 was just ‘a temporary phase of maladjustment’.58 
                                                          
48 See, e.g., Ronald Schettkatt, ‘Are Institutional Rigidities at the Root of European Unemployment’ (2003) 27 Cambridge Journal of 
Economics 6, 772. 
49 Ibid. 772. 
50 For the view that capitalism could succeed by incorporating a fundamental reform, see e.g, M Kalecki, ‘Political Aspects of Full 
Employment’ (1943) 14 Political Quarterly 4, 330. 
51 See Stockhammer (n 35), 308; Lerner (n 37). In his General Theory of Employment, Keynes noted that ‘There is, therefore, no ground 
for the belief that a flexible wage policy is capable of maintaining a state of continuous full employment’, 267; Lawlor (n 30), 91, referring 
to Keynes’ opinion that a policy of ‘economy-wide wage reductions would never cure mass unemployment’, 87. 
52 See Paul Lewis, ‘(How) Do Flexible Labour Markets Really Work? The Role of Profitability in Influencing Unemployment’ (2009) 33 
Cambridge Journal of Economics 1, 55. 
53 See, e.g., The Foundation Forum, ‘Social and Employment Policies for a Fair and Competitive Europe’, Background Paper (2013), 8. 
54 Lerner (n 37), 14. 
55 Ibid. 16. 
56  For such a negative scenario, see Miguel D. Ramirez, ‘Marx, Wages, and Cyclical Crisis: A Critical Interpretation’ (2007) 26 
Contributions to Political Economy, 37. 
57 John M. Keynes, ‘Economic Possibilities for our Grandchildren (1930)’ in Lorenzo Pecchi and Gustavo Piga (eds.) Revisiting Keynes: 
Economic Possibilities for our Grandchildren (Cambridge, Massachusetts: MIT Press, 2010), 21. 
58 Ibid. 
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Equally, creating a larger pool of low-paid, insecure workers could magnify unemployment 
through restructuring. Such an outcome challenges the expectation that higher corporate profits 
will, in return, yield greater capital investments in human resources. 59  Worse than corporate 
restructuring is the aforementioned anti-competitive practice of social camouflage, i.e., hiring new 
employees in the hope that older ones will subsequently leave. In the name of economic efficiency, 
this perverse phenomenon becomes just another attack on jobs, i.e., employment. 
G. Employment Theories: A Convoluted Approach to the Unemployment Problem? 
In his famous ‘General Theory of Employment, Interest, and Money’, Keynes put forward the 
argument that trade unions might resist falling wages more vigorously than rising prices.60 Relying 
on classical assumptions of perfect competition, Keynes examined the supply of labour as a function 
of money similar to real wages. The latter implied bargaining for ‘money wages’.61 Where aggregate 
demand met aggregate supply, i.e., effective demand, the expectations of corporate profits were best 
maximised. 62  In an attempt to simplify his theory of employment, Keynes advanced that ‘the 
psychology of the public, the level of output and employment as a whole depends on the amount of 
investment’.63  
By adding a subjective factor, i.e., the psychology of the public, to the unemployment puzzle, 
Keynes complicated the equation. 64  Furthermore, Keynes regarded investment not as the sole 
objective factor on which aggregate output depends, but certainly as a key one, i.e., causa causans. In 
other words, Keynes found inadequate capital accumulation and/or closely related high interest 
rates to be the real causes of high unemployment. Therefore, Keynes advanced three major variables 
of employment: the ‘propensity to consume’, which can be influenced by the distribution of income 
or the rate of interest; the efficiency of capital; and the liquidity preference.65 Together with the 
quantity of money, these variables influence the level of output and employment. Although Keynes’ 
intention was to advance ‘a theory of why output and employment’ were ‘liable to fluctuation’, his 
theory became ‘a ready-made remedy’ about avoiding fluctuations and maintaining an optimal level 
of output. 
                                                          
59 See, e.g., Lewis (n 52), 71. 
60 Jan A. Kregel, ‘The Microfoundations of the ‘Generalisation of The General Theory’ and ‘bastard Keynesianism’: Keynes’s theory of 
employment in the long and the short period’ (1983) 7 Cambridge Journal of Economics, 351. On the effect of a change in real wages, 
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Money, Interest and Wages: Collected Essays in Economic Theory (Oxford: Blackwell, 1982), vol. 2, 10. 
61 See Edgar O. Edwards, ‘Classical and Keynesian Employment Theories: A Reconciliation’ (1959) 73 Quarterly Journal of Economics 3, 
409. 
62 Edwards (n 61), 413. 
63 John M. Keynes, The General Theory of Employment, Interest and Money. The Collected Writings of John Maynard Keynes (1936), vol. 7 
(London: Palgrave Macmillan, 1973), 221. 
64 See John Considine and David Duffy, ‘Keynes and the Confidence Faeries’ (2014) 40 Cambridge Journal of Economics 1, 8. 
65 See John M Keynes, ‘The General Theory of Employment’ (1937) 51 Quarterly Journal of Economics 2, 219. On income distribution, 
see Sidney Weintraub, ‘Solow and Stiglitz on Employment and Distribution: A New Romance with an Old Model’ (1970) 84 Quarterly 
Journal of Economics 1, 150; on the four variables and the limitations of Keynes’ general theory, see Richard F. Kahn The Making of 
Keynes’ General Theory (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,  1st ed. 1984, reprinted 2011), 126-68; Tyler B. Goodspeed, Rethinking the 
Keynesian Revolution: Keynes, Hayek and the Wicksell Connection (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012), 86-99. 
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Keynes’ theory of employment ‘explains why, in any given circumstances, employment is what it 
is’.66 A major weakness of his theory remains the perceived tolerance towards budgetary indiscipline, 
through encouragement of more public spending, i.e., Keynes’s ‘digging holes’ suggestion.67 In ‘Can 
Lloyd George Do it?’,68 Keynes argued for undertaking major public works, financed by borrowing, 
as a temporary solution to unemployment. As a preliminary finding, while one cannot alleviate a 
public debt crisis following the Keynesian commitment to continued debt-financed public spending, 
one can also no longer rely on credit-financed private consumption either.  
Ultimately, Keynes argued that, in the long run, the demand for investment depends on the rate 
of interest. In contrast, the demand for consumer goods was a short-term expectation.69 Other 
commentators argued that a fall in interest rates increases long-term unemployment.70 Hicks, for 
instance, identified separate markets for goods, loans, and money. Using bread as an example, Hicks 
explained the relationship among wages, employment, capital, and the interest rate. If labourers’ 
wages were to be raised, there would be an excess demand for bread. As the supply of bread is 
inelastic, the interest rate would need to be raised, too, so as to reach an optimal equilibrium in the 
market for bread. Otherwise, producers would be forced to counteract the wage increase by lowering 
their profits. Therefore, consumption would also decline. In conclusion, the rise of real wages is 
nothing but an increase in the marginal cost of output. Despite excessive demand, future output can 
be adjusted downwards. Bread producers can substitute ‘past’ for ‘current’ labour. Due to the rise in 
real wages, the interest rate will also follow. This will ultimately cause unemployment.71 
From the above example, one can only conclude that higher wages contribute to unemployment 
following a concomitant rise in the interest rate. This confirms another preliminary finding, namely, 
that wage reductions could lead to an expansion of output and employment through the liquidity 
preference and propensity to consume.72 
Throughout the 1970s, several economists attempted to develop ‘microeconomic’ foundations for 
Keynes’ macroeconomic theory of employment.73 They attempted to re-assess the causes of Keynes’ 
‘involuntary’ unemployment. Wage ‘rigidities’ were identified as incompatible with the ideal of full 
                                                          
66 Ibid. 221. 
67 See Considine and Duffy (n 64); see, e.g., Maria C. Marcuzzo, ‘Re-embracing Keynes: Scholars, Admirers, and Sceptics in the Aftermath 
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70 Joan Robinson, Essays in the Theory of Employment (London: Macmillan, 1937), 121. 
71 See, e.g., Kregel (n 60), 354. 
72 Ibid. 355. 
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employment.74 Such wages offer firms few, if any, incentives to hire unemployed workers as long as 
firms remain unable to sell the goods that they produce.  
Keynes’s theory of employment, however, did not rely upon price-wage rigidities. Instead, for 
Keynes, the way out of the vicious circle of unemployment was the price-wage deflation. 75 
Historically, the Great Depression had been attributed to the public deficit problem, the blocking of 
the free market for labour due to wages and price rigidities, and oligopolistic competition. 76 
However, for Keynes, the hidden cause of unemployment was the high rate of interest maintained for 
a long period of time.77  
Falling wages and prices and the imposition of a minimum wage are other intricate issues. As the 
value of assets held by the private sector rises to stimulate consumption, this could reduce 
unemployment. Where the minimum wage is higher than the wage required to clear the market, 
then, the supply could exceed the demand for labour. Furthermore, due to the monopsony power of 
employers, the imposition of a ‘minimum’ wage may raise the level of employment.78 This happens 
where workers have imperfect information about wages, unemployment is high, and the rate of 
vacancies is low. Were firms to enjoy monopsony power in the labour market, they could offer a 
lower than average wage.79 
For the ‘insider-outsider’ theory of employment, the relative bargaining power of a firm vis-à-vis 
its labourers makes it possible for ‘insider’ wages to exceed those of outsiders. The entry wage 
would only exceed the reservation wage.80 However, firms having higher rates of labour turnover 
fail to offer job security and provide no opportunity for promotion, which results in low levels of 
productivity. 
The monopsony power of strong unions has also been considered responsible for rising wages 
and, as a result, for unemployment.81 Stiglitz’s theory relies on the existence of perfectly competitive 
labour markets with perfect information. Such a market is based on a bilateral monopoly, or even 
monopolistic competition.82 On both sides of the labour market, there are significant costs associated 
with job searches, hiring, and training. Thus, non-unionised workers receive lower wages.83 In 
contrast, by promoting higher wages in unionised sectors of the economy, employers have to offer 
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higher wages.84 Such ‘efficiency wages’ could make employers more selective in hiring. Better wages 
are believed to lead to greater productivity as well as to profitability due to lower labour turnover. 
In any event, claims that unions exert a monopolistic power in the setting of wages, including by 
increasing wages, are best treated with caution.85 Attempts to diminish the collective bargaining 
power of trade unions will ultimately weaken the position of individual labourers, which causes 
unemployment, too. Sometimes, employers also enjoy monopsony power and make employees accept 
wages below the market level, which puts off some workers and, as a result, lowers the level of 
employment.86 
Finally, the Shapiro-Stiglitz model of wage-efficiency argued that the European social policy 
inadvertently causes higher levels of unemployment due to offering higher unemployment ‘benefits’. 
While offering some sort of social protection, the latter are actually welfare enhancing.87  
Although none of the above theories of employment is fully satisfactory, these theories offer a 
solid analytical framework for the next discussion of the uneasy relationship between the ‘price’ and 
‘wage’ efficiency divide in micro-and macroeconomics scholarship. 
 
III. Back to Basics: The Uneasy Relationship between ‘Price’ and ‘Wage’ Efficiency 
This section discusses the historic ‘price efficiency’ benchmark undertaken by microeconomics, i.e., 
having the aim of always delivering the lowest possible market price, which is at odds with the 
antagonistic objective of ‘wage efficiency’ undertaken by macroeconomics. It does so by reflecting on 
the complex but uneasy relationship between market prices and wages. In this respect, Adam Smith 
notably offers the example of monopolists who ‘by keeping the market constantly under-stocked’ do 
not meet actual demand so that they can sell well above the natural price of free competition, and 
later raise wages or profits ‘greatly above their natural rate’.88 One could argue that in the absence of 
competition, monopolies deliver better wages; in contrast, efficiency-driven fierce competition drives 
wages down. However, the aforementioned ‘efficiency’ benchmark is just a pathway towards the 
Marshallian doctrine of ‘maximum satisfaction’.89 For the pursuit of the latter, both producers and 
consumers will, egocentrically, look after their own individual interests, namely, those of their 
capital and labour, and their expenditure respectively. The immediate interest of an individual 
monopolist is to obtain the maximum net revenue by adjusting production and sales; however, this 
will be on a collision course with the collective interests of the society at large.90 Better suited, 
therefore, is Stigler’s ethical concept of ‘social efficiency’, which reflects the ‘socially optimum’, since 
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‘the most efficient’ firm size may be caused by monopoly power, undesirable labour practices, 
discriminatory legislation and so on.91 
Furthermore, this section attempts to contrast theory with practice with the help of real world 
examples. These days, it is unsurprising to see a shortage of popular brands in supermarkets only to 
have their prices pushed up. However, while economic theory assumes that higher prices will be 
channelled towards higher corporate profits, they do not necessarily lead to higher wages for 
workers, so they fail to deliver the latter in practice. In the context of mergers, it cannot be 
completely ruled out that the emerging monopoly might have a positive impact on wages. This 
latter theoretic assumption remains to be challenged at a later stage. 
Moving on from the classical example, a contemporary example of a contrasting real-life scenario 
is offered by the Commissioner for Competition when talking about the over-capacity of the steel 
industry. Relying on Wells’ example of steam-driven machinery, Letwin also captures the problem 
of ‘industrial overproduction’, i.e., ‘excessive competition’, where manufacturers struggle to sell 
unwanted goods and therefore ‘combinations’, i.e., mergers, appear as the only possible solution.92 
The steel industry went through a painful process of restructuring to make its business more 
competitive.93 In the context of state aid, granting national subsidies to maintain over-capacity in 
the Italian steel sector was seen as effectively putting ‘other’ steelworkers’ jobs at risk across 
Europe. The above example offers conclusive evidence of the close, but inverse, relationship that 
exists between the lowest possible price as an indicator of economic efficiency and the 
macroeconomic prospect of job security. 
In contrast to harmful monopolies, which maintain artificially high prices above those that could 
arise from competition under free markets, fierce competition delivers the lowest possible market 
price. Naturally arising lower prices are an efficient market outcome. As has already been 
mentioned, higher corporate profits might negatively affect wages if corporations become too greedy 
to invest in human resources and choose not to contribute towards better wages. Alternatively, 
lower prices could lead to overproduction and possibly lower corporate profits, which could make 
the social impact on wages much worse. 
The ideal of price efficiency can be reached only through vigorous competition. The same game of 
competition drives labour markets and, implicitly, the ideal of wage efficiency.94 In this context, 
Smith recalls the exclusive privileges of corporations, as well as of employment laws, which could 
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restrain labour market competition to a smaller number of workers. Depicted as ‘enlarged 
monopolies’, by making employment opportunities available to only a select category of individuals, 
the relevant market price was kept above the natural price of free market competition, as were the 
wages of the employed labour and monopolistic corporate profits.  
The overarching concept of efficiency works differently for market prices and wages. If one were 
to employ the same natural level for workers’ wages as for the natural market price, the lowest 
market price would be on a par with the lowest possible living wage for individuals. For example, 
Ricardo’s concept of the ‘original state of efficiency’ considers primarily the costs associated with 
paying the wages for the labour necessary for the production of goods, which makes the trade 
surplus, i.e., profit, dependent on efficiency wages minus additional expenses.95 Were such labour 
costs lower than they should be, then the monopolists could add another monopoly margin to those 
extracted from the overpriced sale of goods. 
The Marshallian explanation of wage efficiency recognises ‘equal earnings (or rather equal net 
advantages), which are achieved in the long run in different occupations by ‘persons of about equal 
efficiency’.96 It also recognises the difficulty associated with the definition of wage efficiency97 and 
embraces therefore a broader interpretation, i.e., that of ‘general industrial efficiency’. Marshall 
usefully mentions the tendency of competition towards offering equal earnings to people engaged in 
the same trade or in trades of equal difficulty. The principles of economic freedom, equality, and 
fairness permeate classical economics. For Marshall, ‘economic freedom and enterprise’, which were 
commonly referred to as ‘competition’, displayed ‘a tendency towards equality of efficiency-
earnings’.98 For Pigou, ‘fair’ wages are ‘proportionated to efficiency’.99 In contrast, ‘unfairly’ low 
wages are where ‘the cost of movement’ prevents ‘workpeople’ from moving elsewhere where the 
rate wage is higher.100 Later, however, Pigou clarifies that ‘fair wages would be equal wages’.101 
Meanwhile, for Pikkety, ‘efficiency wages’ make workers more cooperative, as they are paid a ‘fair’ 
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wage.102 Finally, for Greenwald and Stiglitz, the ‘efficiency wage’ model explains why the wages of 
firms are interdependent, which leads to ‘multiple equilibria’.103 
The ideals of efficiency inherent in each of the two scenarios explained above stand diametrically 
opposed to each other. It does not follow that monopolies are necessarily bad for prices but good for 
wages. On the contrary, while monopolies might preserve monopoly rents for a select group of 
shareholders, the wider public trusts that these monopolistic entities create and secure jobs for the 
economy at large. Out of sentimentality, there is public sympathy towards monopolists should a fine 
imposed on them be perceived to lead, immediately, to job losses; giants such as Google or Apple are 
obvious examples these days. In contrast, there is no outcry when a smaller or medium-sized firm 
exits the market, because their business is not regarded publicly as a success story; it is not seen as 
something that could adversely affect employment at large. 
As will be examined in the following sections, the merger of powerful corporations might lead to 
a monopolistic constellation. Therefore, the practical question to be asked is whether, at the 
microeconomic level, the market price will be moving towards the efficiency ideal and, if so, how 
this, in turn, will affect wages at the macroeconomic level, or whether the underlying rationale for 
merging is simply reducing labour costs. In principle, it is assumed that mergers bring about 
external growth and new jobs. Ultimately, efficiency arguments could twist the outcome of a merger 
towards jobs losses.  
 
IV. Economic Efficiency as a Goal of Competition Policy 
This section briefly discusses the goals of competition policy, including considerations of 
distribution versus economic efficiency as a goal that should be pursued by merger control. There 
are conflicting views on the many goals that competition policy has embraced over time. Indeed, 
there is more than one goal that deserves attention. However, policy-makers often state which goal 
takes precedence at a given time. Over the last decade, EU commissioners responsible for 
competition policy have projected various goals of competition law. Amongst them, market 
integration, economic efficiency, consumer welfare and the social market economy have gradually 
grown in substance over the years.104 The ‘social side’ of competition law was featured in President 
Juncker’s speech on the ‘State of the Union’ as follows: 
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‘In Europe, consumers are protected against cartels and abuses by powerful companies. This goes against 
giants like Apple too. In Europe we do not accept powerful companies getting illegal backroom deals on their 
taxes. The Commission watches over this fairness. This is the social side of competition law’.105 
The fact that goals conflict with each other is nothing new. Kaysen and Turner argued in favour 
of a hierarchy of goals considering both the limitation of market power and the achievement of 
desirable economic performance. They suggested that ‘in so far as reduction of market power is 
incompatible with efficiency and progressiveness’, the first goal is subordinate to the second.106 
Therefore, efficiency is best seen as an instrument to achieve economic progress. For Kaysen and 
Turner, there should be no competition intervention that could make a few efficient firms exercise 
their own market power where the cost of intervention could see a substantial loss in efficiency. 
Nonetheless, ‘where market power exists and can be reduced without sacrifices in performance, then 
such action is desirable without reference to the question of how good over-all performance may 
have been’.107 In practice, it is difficult to predict how competition intervention against monopolistic 
giants could worsen the quality or the performance of the products concerned. Retrospectively, one 
could assess, for example, whether the intervention against Microsoft’s Internet Explorer has, 
indeed, made the browser more efficient. The positive side of that intervention is that, indeed, it did 
open up the market for browsers. 
A. Could Fair Redistribution Reduce Inequality? 
It has been advanced that, when drafting the Sherman Act, the US Congress intended primarily to 
encourage redistribution, not efficiency.108 The former interpretation endorses the consideration of 
equity109 as a legitimate concern of antitrust laws that are called upon to improve the distribution of 
income, thereby addressing the increasing inequality due to the ‘large scale accumulation of 
wealth’. 110  However, while the Congress did not enact the Sherman Act to ensure the ‘fair’ 
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distribution of wealth from the rich to help the poor,111 it did aim to prevent unfair transfers of 
wealth from individual consumers to large corporate trusts. This was understood in the sense that 
the objective of antitrust law is ‘essentially a political rather than an economic enterprise’.112 In this 
respect, Stiglitz regarded the social concern of the Progressive era as an ‘attack’ against monopolies 
and trusts, which was motivated more by concerns about political and social consequences than by 
market ‘distortions’.113 In a similar vein, Pikkety argues that, in contrast to ‘efficient’ redistribution, 
‘pure’ redistribution is justified by considerations of ‘social justice’, not by market ‘failure’. 114 
Redistribution, then, is best achieved through taxation and transfers rather than through price 
control.115 As the latter may involve shortages and rationing, Pikkety favours redistribution as a 
more efficient way ‘to help the poor cope with high prices by means of fiscal transfers’.116  
Nonetheless, while some commentators expressed concern over the cost of redistribution,117 
others suggested taxation as a better avenue for dealing with distribution.118 Indeed, redistribution 
could be socially costly, and it remains, therefore, solely a second-best choice. In particular, Kaplow 
expressed concerns over labour inefficiency created by the tax and transfer system, which by taxing 
‘more heavily those who earn more income’ engages in cross-subsidisation of individuals who earn 
less income.119  
Whilst fair redistribution is the most desirable outcome of the process of competition, dealing 
with income inequality is beyond the purpose of competition law.120 Of course, one could argue that 
competition intervention against anti-competitive behaviour, including abnormal corporate profits, 
could indirectly address the problem of raising inequality. Recent studies have evidenced a negative 
relation between inequality and growth, on the one hand, and a ‘weak’ relationship between 
redistribution and growth, on the other. 121  Stiglitz advanced that, beyond increased monopoly 
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power, exploitative (real estate) rents are responsible for increased inequality, and policies have to be 
devised to reduce rents and tax profits at ‘very high rates’.122 In contrast, Pikkety suggests that the 
source of inequality that needs to be addressed stems from labour income, i.e., wage inequality, 
rather than from inequality between capital and labour.123 
However, further research into micro-and macroeconomic policy analysis needs to be undertaken 
so as to explore the relationship between inequality, redistribution, and growth.124 From the above 
considerations, it follows that competition law is not only law, but also ‘a socio-political statement 
about our society’ in general.125 Hovenkamp described this phenomenon as ‘legal formalism’, which 
instructed lawyers searching for the meaning of competition law not to look outside their case 
reporters.126 Nonetheless, Hofstadter identified social goals of antitrust alongside economic, political 
and moral goals. Oberschall and Leifer raised yet another interesting issue on the use by sociologists 
of the term ‘function’, instead of ‘goal’, as something that is sought to be accomplished.127 
B. Why the Social Side of Mergers Should No Longer Be Ignored? 
It is rather unfortunate that subsequent government administrations often chose to ignore social 
goals in the interpretation of the Sherman Act.128 Following a similar critical line on the legacy of 
the Reagan administration, Broder noted that the enforcement of mergers was then no longer 
hostile towards ‘potentially troublesome mergers and acquisitions’. As a consequence, antitrust 
enforcers helped the transactions in question to go ahead.129 Neither did the Bush administration 
make any attempt to block mergers. 130  As Foer explained, the justification for this deliberate 
exclusion of social goals tied to political ones was based on the perception of subjectivity, which 
could later be negatively affixed to antitrust decision-making.131  
However, it is no longer possible to validly claim that enforcing antitrust laws solely with 
objective economic criteria in mind means that this kind of enforcement would always be effective in 
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eliminating various biases or even a misuse of economic theories. The salience of economics should 
not make sociological factors less valuable for the modern analysis of antitrust laws. As Duesenberry 
once noted, ‘Economics is all about why people make choices, while sociology is all about why they 
don’t have any choices to make’.132 By paying attention to the socio-economic factors that could 
adversely affect social welfare, antitrust enforcement could better service the public, rather than 
corporate interests. 
It has been argued elsewhere133 that the congressional debates on both the Sherman and the 
Clayton Acts do not reveal any interest in efficiency as an objective of antitrust policy. Indeed, 
making efficiency the goal of antitrust ‘may signify a false consensus’.134 In contrast, Bork famously 
stirred up controversy by arguing that the task of antitrust law has to be seen as an ‘effort to 
improve allocative efficiency without impairing productive efficiency so greatly so as to produce 
either no gain or a net loss in consumer welfare’.135 Otherwise, antitrust laws could negatively affect 
consumer welfare. Despite his nebulous use of ‘consumer welfare’, Bork succeeded in imposing136 it 
as a legitimate, even if unwritten, goal of the US antitrust law. Attempting to place economic 
efficiency in a wider context of market outcomes, modern industrial organization refers to a 
situation where ‘it is impossible to find some small change in the allocation of capital, labour, goods 
or services that would improve the well-being of one individual in the market without hurting any 
other’.137  
From the perspective of firms producing goods or offering services, measuring their own price 
efficiency at a microeconomic level is something that looks primarily at the difference between the 
maximum amount a consumer could spend and the actual price that the consumer ultimately pays. 
Similarly, if one seeks to measure macroeconomic labour efficiency for the other side of the market, 
then firms will have to look at the maximum and minimum salary that could be paid to maximize 
profits. Therefore, an evaluation of ‘microeconomic’ efficiency as desired by firms clashes with the 
pursuit of ‘macroeconomic’ efficiency as a market outcome servicing the public at large. In other 
words, there are two kinds of efficiencies, depending on which economic level one chooses to 
examine. 
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In the probability of a merger scenario, competition authorities undertake a well-established 
analysis to determine the kind of efficiencies brought about by the merger itself.138 It is, however, 
assumed that if the merger will lead to a reduction in variable costs, this will create an incentive for 
the merged entity to subsequently reduce prices to the benefit of consumers. Commentators have 
suggested that any reductions in fixed costs, including cuts in the number of office staff, will not 
adversely affect pricing.139 The so-called ‘efficiencies’ brought about by a merger have to be ‘specific’, 
i.e., any reductions in costs must be the result of the merger, must be verifiable, and must benefit 
consumers.140 These efficiencies reduce production costs per unit. It is assumed that this will later 
increase the margins and offer the company involved an incentive to reduce the unit price.141 While 
the whole process will benefit final consumers through further price reductions, it becomes 
nonetheless clear that ‘many mergers are allegedly beneficial because of their elimination of all sort 
of redundancies, which very often include labour. Unemployment compensation and related costs are 
externalities of such mergers that are unrecognised in the antitrust analysis’.142 In other words, 
mergers have a direct, and thus negative, impact on labour. At the same time, the ‘microeconomic’ 
efficiency brought about by a merger through cost reductions will ultimately result in lower prices. 
Other efficiencies stem, for example, from the specialisation of labour, i.e., workers are able to 
perform certain tasks more efficiently; from the operation of higher capacity equipment, which 
requires less labour;143 or from the sharing of managerial or sales expertise.144 Leaving aside the 
resultant price efficiency, this positive side of mergers comes at the expense of considerable staff 
redundancies and, as a result, job losses. To date, economists have advanced limited empirical 
research on the negative effect of mergers on jobs in the long run.145 
It has been argued that, after the implementation of a merger, the merged entity has to strike a 
difficult balance between the need to reduce labour costs and the need to minimise workplace 
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disruptions.146 The assumption is that implementing job cuts could see the merged entity having its 
own performance adversely affected due to a potentially very high staff turnover. The latter is 
widespread in the U.S. banking industry where aggressive staff replacements took place with the 
aim of reducing labour costs.147 There is, of course, further scope for achieving efficiency following 
the elimination of duplicate job descriptions. However, any cuts of previously available jobs means 
an increasing burden on existing employees. Other exceptional cases have emerged in the process of 
privatisation where outdated technologies had to be eliminated and, consequently, many jobs were 
lost. In the long run, other jobs have been created, making the previous losses a painful, but short-
term, economic shock. 
 
V. The Impact of Mergers & Acquisitions on Employment  
This section seeks to examine the impact of mergers and acquisitions on employment and in so 
doing to fill in a gap in the literature. Drawing on the efforts of a previous study148 on the negative 
consequences of mergers and acquisitions, which highlighted large-scale job losses, the EU 
Restructuring Monitor identified 3.7 million job losses as a result of the restructuring activity 
undertaken during 2002-2007. Approximately 6.5% of these job losses were caused by mergers and 
acquisitions, that is, 240,000 jobs during a five-year period. 




6.6 2.9 3.8 5.3 11 9.9 6.5 
Some of the high profile cases of job losses involved various sectors of the economy from 
pharmaceuticals, oil, steel, telecommunications, and banking, to the automobile industry. Prominent 
examples are, for example, the acquisition of Schering by Bayer with nearly 5,350 jobs cut, of which 
3,150 were in Europe; Statoil-Norsk Hydro, with 3,500 redundancies; Arcelor and Mittal Steel, with 
2,700 direct and 2,280 indirect jobs lost; 1,000 jobs at Neuf Telecom and Cegetel; 2,600 jobs at ABN 
AMRO and Royal Bank of Scotland/Fortis/Banco Santander; 7,500 jobs at Fortis bank; 11,300 jobs 
at Renault and Automobile Dacia; and 2,250 jobs at Boots and Alliance UniChem. 
A. Some Reflections on the Negative Impact of M&A 
Drawing on the data provided by the Restructuring Monitor, the table below identifies the type of 
restructuring activities involving mergers and acquisitions. The table highlights the creation of any 
planned jobs against imminent job losses. For the period under review of just four years, the results 
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show that only 1,420 new jobs had been created for 56,703 jobs cut that is, one newly created job for 
every 40 jobs cut. This result challenges the previously held assumption that mergers and 
acquisitions are positive in the sense that they bring about economic growth and therefore better job 
prospects. It exposes a net economic benefit of around 2.5% (1/40 ratio) in terms of job prospects. 
The above findings are limited to the period between 2013 and 2016, but do not include major 
economic shocks, for example, post-Brexit149 job prospects. The majority of mergers have had a 
devastating impact on jobs, despite assumptions that labour costs are not to be seen as an incentive 
to merge. It could also be argued that, in the long run, more jobs could eventually be created, but 
the facts have revealed the opposite. 
The vast majority of mergers notified to the EU Commission are approved, even where these 
approvals may be subject to conditions; thus, from 21 September 1990 to 31 July 2018, this 
accounted for an insignificant percentage (0.37%),150 that is, 27 blocked mergers out of a total of 
7,037 notified mergers. A tiny fraction of mergers have been the subject of a prohibition decision 
under Article 8.3 of the EU Merger Control Regulation 139/2004. One good reason for a tempered 
criticism of the blocking of this fraction is given by an American commentator, who recently noted 
that ‘indeed, the competition authorities of the European Commission (EC) have been even more 
aggressive in pursuing their enforcement agenda than have their U.S. counterparts’. 151  Other 
commentators asserted that blocking a merger could eventually lead to the market exit of a poorly 
performing firm.152 
B. The Remaining Gap in the EU Merger Control – Historical and Intentional 
Historically, the introduction of EU merger control rules led to controversy over whether this gap 
in the Treaty of Rome was left intentionally, with the purpose of a late introduction of a national 
industrial policy.153 The subsequent exploration of the historical roots of the Treaty provisions 
revealed that a later introduction of merger control had already been envisaged by the Spaak 
report.154  Koch concluded that in the 1950s, there was simply no political appetite for merger 
control.155 The founding Member States feared losing their ‘economic sovereignty’ over national 
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industrial concerns.156  After many years of growing concentrations of power, calls followed to 
introduce merger control. As has already been explained, the economic regulation of mergers did 
not particularly harm the agglomeration of market power, as the overwhelming majority went ahead 
to obtain approval by the EU Commission. It is, therefore, doubtful that the enforcement has, 
indeed, achieved what was initially hoped for, namely, the keeping of monopolistic concentrations 
under control. This constructive criticism goes hand in hand with pertinent evidence provided by 
economic experts. Upon closer examination of thirteen mergers, Gore, Lewis, Lofaro, and Dethmers 
raised concerns over these mergers being ultimately cleared unconditionally, despite a clear picture 
that was indicative of dominance.157 




5/4/2016 Ireland Paddy Power Arts/entertainment 0 250 
5/4/2016 UK Paddy Power Betfair Arts/entertainment 0 350 
15/3/2016 Sweden Orbit One Manufacturing 0 40 
16/2/2016 Germany DZ Bank Financial services 0 700 
1/2/2016 Netherlands Vivat Financial services 0 900 
25/1/2016 Ireland Intuity Information/communication 100 0 
14/12/2015 World Shell Mining/quarrying 0 2.800 
3/12/2015 Belgium GlaxoSmithKline Manufacturing 0 170 
1/12/2015 France Société nationale 
Corse Méditerranée 
Transportation/storage 0 583 
13/11/2015 France Futurol Construction 0 228 
30/10/2015 UK Caparo Manufacturing 0 43 
28/10/2015 Spain Lafarge/Holcim Manufacturing 0 99 
26/10/2015 France Gérard Darel Manufacturing 0 130 
21/10/2015 France Brit Air Transportation 0 66 
21/10/2015 Netherlands Q8 Europoort Manufacturing 0 100 
24/9/2015 France 3SI Holding Retail 0 140 
11/9/2015 Sweden SSAB Manufacturing 0 270 
1/9/2015 Spain Vodafone Spain Information/communication 0 1,059 
31/8/2015 Austria Baumax Retail 0 400 
6/8/2015 World Merck Manufacturing 0 2,585 
21/7/2015 France Alcatel Lucent EU Manufacturing 0 83 
16/7/2015 France Hop! Transportation/storage 0 250 
9/7/2015 France L’Express Roularta Information/communication 0 240 
25/6/2015 France La Dépêche Journaux 
du Midi 
Information/communication 0 350 
25/6/2015 France La Dépêche Journaux 
du Midi 
Information/communication 0 300 
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12/6/2015 Norway Coop Norge Retail 0 500 
29/5/2015 France Alma Consulting 
Group 
Professional services 66 156 
19/5/2015 France Lafarge Manufacturing 37 166 
15/5/2015 Italy Olivetti Manufacturing  0 75 
5/5/2015 World Lafarge Manufacturing 37 380 
4/5/2015 Italy Ansaldo Breda Manufacturing 0 282 
29/4/2015 Spain BBVA Financial services 0 1,557 
28/4/2015 France Verreries de Manières Financial services 0 119 
24/3/2015 Poland Alior Bank Financial services 0 1,000 
9/3/2015 Italy Firema Transporti Manufacturing 0 119 
5/3/2015 Poland BankBGZ Financial services 0 1,800 
26/2/2015 Germany Noelke Manufacturing 0 144 
19/2/2015 Croatia OTP Bank Financial services 0 124 
19/2/1015 France Abattoirs Industriels 
de la Manche 
Manufacturing 0 314 
15/1/2015 Spain Barclays Bank Financial services 0 975 
8/1/2015 Malta Autobuses de León 
(Malta Public 
Transport) 
Transportation/storage 300 0 
24/12/2014 France Arc International Manufacturing 150 550 
17/12/2014 UK Dixons Carphone Retail 0 400 
11/12/2014 Netherlands Wegener Information/communication 0 275 
11/12/2014 Finland M-Brain Information/communication 0 32 
5/12/2014 France Tilly Sabco Bretagne Manufacturing 0 118 
5/12/2014 Spain Vodafone Information/communication 0 1,000 
1/12/2014 France Altia Manufacturing 0 41 
1/12/2014 Germany Sachtleben Manufacturing 0 527 
19/11/2014 Germany HansaGroup Manufacturing 0 100 
11/11/2014 Germany Riha Wesergold Manufacturing 0 180 
29/10/2014 France Mobilier européen Retail 0 1,003 
27/10/2014 France Caddie Manufacturing  0 252 
24/10/2014 UK Monarch Airlines Transportation/storage 0 700 
18/10/2014 Germany Telefónica Information/communication 0 1,600 
16/10/2014 Netherlands Ziggo Information/communication 0 450 
7/10/2014 France Peugeot Motocycles Manufacturing 0 90 
29/9/2014 France Gad Manufacturing 0 289 
17/9/2014 France Isoa Manufacturing 0 114 
16/9/2014 Spain Orange Information/communication 0 550 
5/9/2014 Germany iSoft Information/communication 0 70 
1/8/2014 Finland Starkki and 
Puukeskus 
Retail 0 100 
28 
25/7/2014 France CEIT Manufacturing 0 131 
17/7/2014 World Microsoft Information/communication 0 18,000 
18/6/2014 France Pixmania Retail 0 187 
17/6/2014 Sweden Sydsvenkan Information/communication 0 160 
14/6/2014 Poland Boryszew Manufacturing 130 0 
6/6/2014 France Jardiland Retail 0 230 
30/4/2014 Italy General Montaggi Construction 0 100 
26/4/2014 Germany Gardner Denver 
Deutschland 
Manufacturing 0 87 
10/4/2014 France Manufacture 
vosgienne de meubles 
(MVM) 
Manufacturing 0 43 
31/3/2014 UK Creative Foods Manufacturing 0 149 
26/3/2014 France NextiraOneFrance Manufacturing 0 277 
12/3/2014 Germany Bosch Solar Energy Manufacturing 0 350 
5/3/2014 Germany PBC Banking 
Services 
Financial services 0 300 
26/2/2014 France Call Expert Administrative services 0 507 
14/2/2014 Sweden Sparbanken Skane Financial services 0 200 
6/2/2014 France Mory Ducros Transportation/storage 0 2,850 
31/1/2014 France Jean Caby Manufacturing 0 120 
11/1/2014 Netherlands Be Informed Information/communication 0 140 
29/11/2013 UK Menzies Hotel Hotel/restaurants 0 155 
28/11/2013 Germany Conergy SolarModule Manufacturing 0 80 
7/11/2013 Spain Caja Badajoz Financial services 0 193 
6/11/2013 Belgium Mediahuis Information/communication 0 138 
4/11/2013 Czech Republic Telefonica Czech 
Republic 
Information/communication 0 2,000 
30/10/2013 France La Redoute Retail 0 1,178 
30/10/2013 France Europeene Food Retail 0 218 
22/10/2013 France Calaire Chimie Manufacturing 0 111 
30/9/2013 France Sodetal Manufacturing 0 173 
8/8/2013 Bulgaria Ledenika Manufacturing  300 0 
22/7/2013 Romania Autoritatea de 
Supraveghere 
Financiara 
Public administration and defence 300 0 
19/7/2013 France Sony Manufacturing 0 168 
25/6/2013 Austria Hutchinson 3G 
Austria 
Information/communication 0 170 
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The EU merger control rules were introduced in 1989, sixteen years after the presentation of a first 
draft proposal in 1973.158 The legal basis for the enactment of the merger regulation is Article 3 
TEU in conjunction with Protocol 27 on the Internal Market and Competition, which seeks to 
safeguard undistorted competition within the internal market.159 However, a closer examination of 
the 28 years the notification system has been in existence shows the overall enforcement of this area 
remains relatively modest.  
As a preliminary finding, this contribution suggests that the assessment of mergers has been 
based on legal and economic considerations, rather than the social impact that a particular merger 
might have, for example, on job prospects. Otherwise, the analysis of the so-called ‘efficiencies’ 
brought about by the proposed merger could have been endangered by political and social 
considerations, including job insecurity. 
C. Public Interest Mergers: Protecting Jobs or Corporate Profits? 
There is no explicit recognition of the creation, loss, or maintenance of jobs in Regulation 139/2004. 
Indeed, Article 21 (4) of this Regulation allows Member States to ‘take appropriate measures to 
protect legitimate interests other than those taken into consideration by this Regulation and 
compatible with the general principles and other provisions of Community law’. Comparatively, 
under the US antitrust law, the Bank Merger Act of 1966 offers a similar objective justification for 
disapproval of a merger where ‘the anticompetitive effects of the proposed transaction are clearly 
outweighed in the public interest by the probable effect of the transaction in meeting the 
convenience and needs of the community to be served’.160 
Under the EU Merger Control Regulation, the protection of jobs could be seen to fall under the 
ambit of a ‘legitimate interest’. Another legal obstacle against this projection is the fact that Article 
21 (4), second sentence, includes under the concept of public interest ‘public security, plurality of the 
media and prudential rules’. This shortcoming could be overcome by reliance on the last paragraph 
of Article 21 (4), which mandates that ‘any other public interest’ be communicated to the 
Commission for an evaluation.161 However, blocking a merger on the grounds of a social, public 
interest would normally attract criticism for being based on pure politics, rather than on economic 
considerations. In any case, it has already been recognised that merger decisions are not merely 
legal, but also economic or political decisions.162 In the UK, the public interest exception under 
Section 58 of the Enterprise Act has successfully been raised several times in the media sector, e.g., 
                                                          
158 See Manuel Kellerbauer, ‘Erwägungsgründe zur FKVO’ in Berg and Mäsch (n 140), 1433. 
159 Ibid. 1433. 
160 Broder (n 129), 26, para 2.34. 
161 To date, reliance on public policy interests has been very rare; see, e.g., Bellamy & Child, Vivien Rose and David Bailey (eds.) European 
Union Law of Competition (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 7th ed., 2013), 568 and 569, para 8.104. For the distinction between 
‘recognised’ and ‘non-recognised’ public interests, see, e.g., Claes Bengtsson, Josep M Carpi Badia and Massimiliano Kadar, ‘Mergers’ in 
Jonathan Faull and Ali Nikpay (eds.) The EU Law of Competition (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 3rd ed., 2014), 607, paras 5.283 and 
5.284. 
162 Fritz Rittner and Michael Kulka, Wettbewerbs- und Kartellrecht (Heidelberg: C.F. Müller, 2008), 381. 
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for the accurate presentation of news, safeguarding the freedom of opinion and plurality of views; on 
grounds of national security, e.g., the maintenance of UK strategic capabilities and the protection of 
classified information; and for maintaining the stability of the financial system, but has recently 
missed the opportunity to protect jobs in the hostile takeover of Cadbury by Kraft.163 
D. The Legal Avenue to Public Interest – Time for an Inclusive Interpretation 
Since the legitimacy of politics in merger control is at best as dubious as the perception of the 
immorality of politicians in the eyes of the general public, the search for the objective of competition 
policy could offer some useful insights into whether sociological aspects should necessarily concern 
economics. The primary objective of a ‘highly social market economy, aimed at full employment’ 
embedded in Article 3 (3) TEU164 could be usefully interpreted in conjunction with Article 21 (4) of 
the EU Merger Regulation. Secondary legislation could be applied in a constructive manner for the 
delivery of ‘full employment’ by clarifying that, ex post, following a merger implementation, new 
jobs must be created and existing ones cannot be eliminated to take advantage of cheaper labour, 
thereby resulting in social dumping.  
E. Social Dumping: An Under-Estimated Phenomenon in Mergers? 
Most mergers rely on relocation to areas where a corporation can effectively cut down on labour 
costs. This phenomenon of ‘social dumping’ has been actively pursued rather than discouraged. The 
Court of Justice of the EU has also referred to social dumping. In his Opinion, Advocate General 
Wahl examined ‘provisions designed to prevent social dumping, which are negotiated and included 
in a collective agreement on behalf of and in the interests of workers’ and concluded that these 
provisions are ‘in principle to be regarded as improving directly their employment and working 
conditions’.165 The Advocate-General considered that it is for the competent court to ‘determine 
whether there exists a real and serious risk of social dumping’.166 
One could recall here that the general objective of the EU is working for ‘the sustainable 
development of Europe’. This is based on ‘balanced economic growth and price stability’ and ‘a 
highly competitive social market economy’, both of which represent the necessary layout for 
                                                          
163 See Jonathan Parker and Adrian Majumdar, UK Merger Control (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2nd ed., 2016), 152-64; Andrew Scott, Morten 
Hviid and Bruce Lyons, Merger Control in the United Kingdom (Oxford: Oxford University Press,2008), 388-95, referring inter alia to Bristol 
Evening Post/David Sullivan, George Outram/Observer, Johnston Press/Trinity Mirror, Trinity International Holdings/Thomson Regional 
Newspapers, Trinity/Mirror Group, Portsmouth & Sunderland Newspapers and Johnston Press/Newsquest (Investments)/News Communications 
and Media, Century Newspapers/TRN and Sky/ITV in the media and to Lloyds TSB and HBOS in the banking sector respectively. For a 
missed opportunity to consider the public interest, see Richard Wachman, ‘Kraft takeover by Cadbury would jeopardise 30,000 jobs, warns 
Unite’ The Guardian (13 January 2010) ‹https://www.theguardian.com/business/2010/jan/13/cadbury-kraft-unite-jobs-warning›; 
Federico Mor, ‘Contested mergers and takeovers’, House of Commons Briefing Paper no. 5374 (24 July 2018); previously, the 
governmental response cautioned against protectionism, see Government Response to the Business, Innovation and Skills Committee’s 
Report on ‘Mergers, Acquisitions and Takeovers: The Takeover of Cadbury by Kraft’, CM 7915 (July 2010). 
164 It is worth recalling that the area in question is one of ‘shared’ competence of the EU with its Member States. More generally, see Mia 
Rönnmar, ‘Labour and equality law’ in Catherine Barnard and Steve Peers (eds.) European Union Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2014), 593. 
165 Opinion of AG Wahl, Case C-413/13, FNV Kunsten Informatie en Media v Staat der Nederlanden [2014], ECLI:EU:C:2014:2215, para 83. 
166 Ibid. para 89. 
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achieving sustainable development. Efficiency is not explicitly mentioned in the context of the above 
wider objectives, but has been seen as a means to this end or as ‘part of this goal’.167 To exacerbate 
the drafting complexity of the Treaty of Lisbon, one could also add Article 119 TFEU’s principle of 
‘open markets with free competition’ based on an ‘efficient allocation of resources’.168 The latter 
provision has placed competition as an economic policy in the context of macroeconomics based on 
price stability, sound public finances and monetary conditions, and a sustainable balance of 
payments. This kind of configuration makes competition an economic policy that integrates two 
sides of the same coin: micro-and macroeconomics.  
F. Fixing Micro-Economics ‘Price’ Efficiency by Breaking Macro-Economics ‘Wage’ 
Efficiency: One Way of Losing Sight of the Bigger Picture 
It can also be argued that the ideal of price and wage efficiency at the microeconomic firm level is 
intertwined with macroeconomic principles of price stability and employment, including job 
creation. Furthermore, it is advanced that the ideal of price efficiency can never be maintained in the 
long run, for example, in the presence of inflation or of a huge public debt. Similarly, the 
requirement of Protocol 27 on ‘Internal Market and Competition’ that competition within the 
internal market should not be distorted cannot allow an uneven playing field of tax competition,169 
whereby certain Member States will misuse tax incentives to attract foreign corporations through 
an extremely low tax base for corporate profits. Inevitably, this kind of competition based on tax 
levels, which could be seen in the Apple case,170 is never based on efficiency or merit alone. Rather, it 
dangerously distorts the macroeconomic principles based on free competition with open markets. It 
is also the first time that a Commissioner for Competition has chosen to tackle the massive 
inequality arising from extremely low taxed corporate profits. By setting a welcome precedent of 
this kind – to the despair of several commentators distraught at losing sight of economic efficiency 
for re-distributive taxation - the enforcement of competition ventures, indeed, into unchartered 
territory, but it does so bravely, as many more corporations could soon follow the same kind of 
much-needed treatment. Tackling this well-known distortion of competition through ‘tax 
competition’ has both the legitimacy and the support of Protocol 27 in conjunction with Title VII on 
‘Common rules on Competition, taxation and approximation of laws’. Furthermore, the avoidance of 
                                                          
167 See Heike Schweitzer, ‘Efficiency, political freedom and the freedom to compete – comment on Maier-Rigaud’ in Zimmer (n 117), 171. 
168 See Anca D Chirita, ‘Legal interpretation and practice versus legal theory: a reconciliation of competition goals’ in Zimmer (n 117), 
123. 
169 For the recent controversy surrounding Apple’s unpaid tax, see also EU Commission, Commissioner for Competition, Margrethe 
Vestager, Speech: ‘Why fair taxation matters’ (Copenhagen, 9 September 2016). 
170 EU Commission, press release IP 162923, ‘State aid: Ireland gave illegal tax benefits to Apple worth up to €13 billion’ (Brussels, 30 
August 2016); COMP SA 38373, Apple, decision of 30 August 2016, C (2016) 5605 final; Joseph Stiglitz, ‘The Apple Tax Tussle Shows the 
Need for a New Way of Taxing Profits’, Süddeutsche Zeitung (19 September 2016), 
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tax controls has also been recognised as one of the main reasons for engaging in vertical integration 
between downstream and upstream firms to achieve cost savings based on low corporate tax.171 
G. About Dividing Lines in Micro-and Macroeconomics and in Competition and Employment 
Laws – No More of Social Isolationism 
As in economics, where both industrial organization and macroeconomics draw dividing lines 
between price and wage efficiency, the EU framework deals with competition rules separately from 
social and employment law. This means that the exclusive focus on economic efficiency, in theory, 
could deliver optimal outcomes when it comes to growth and productivity, but could be less helpful 
where it sacrifices employment and job prospects. In an attempt to address this shortcoming, one 
could look for integration provisions that could re-unite the two areas of concern to achieve a better 
balance between productivity and job creation. This classical solution seeks to identify a flanking or 
integration provision elsewhere in the Treaty.172 For example, Article 9 TEU requires that ‘in 
defining and implementing its policies and activities, the Union shall take into account requirements 
linked to the promotion of a high level of employment’. While the provision has been used in the 
context of employment law, it can be argued that as an economic policy of the European Union, 
competition policy has to seek and actively promote at least a ‘high level of employment’ to reach the 
desired ‘highly competitive social market economy’. The social feature cannot be tied exclusively to 
social protection without firms or corporations being asked to behave responsibly when it comes to 
jobs.  
H. Putting Jobs Ahead of Corporate Profits – How Dreams Can Come True 
Based on the relevant data, a clear case can be made that competition policy has successfully been 
used to achieve economic growth while sacrificing the fair cost of labour. This finding is in line with 
Perrow’s critical assessment of mergers and takeovers as being motivated by power struggles 
among firms within and across markets and the conferral of advantages that may have little to do 
with efficiency.173 
Another available avenue is making better sense of Article 151 TFEU, which mentions the 
promotion of employment aimed at ‘the development of human resources with a view to lasting high 
employment’. There are also weaknesses associated with an approach that could ensure competition 
policy be applied responsibly when it comes to asking businesses to create jobs. For example, job 
creation is encouraged in the context of small and medium-sized enterprises, but has never been de 
facto imposed or otherwise made conditional on monopolists. Similarly, the legal balancing of 
efficiencies as a result of a merger does not need to consider its resultant social impact. 
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172 For an attempted integration of consumer protection provisions under the umbrella of competition law to seek the legitimacy of 
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Although businesses cannot be expected to offer safeguards for jobs, which could eventually 
compromise productive efficiency and later harm consumers, there is a greater potential to block 
international mergers that could destroy local economies, lead to job losses, and amplify social 
inequality. Critics have argued that, similarly, a competition policy would enforce industrial policy 
and bring unwanted protectionism. This position is critical in the sense that it does nothing to 
address the negative impact of the sole focus on efficiency, and it does not contribute to the social 
balance of the market economy. Other critics have seen a real conflict between economic efficiency 
and the reduction of inequality.174 Indeed, they go further and claim that the EU’s low levels of 
economic growth and high unemployment are to be attributed to its excessive concern with equality, 
given the European social welfare state and its highly regulated labour markets. 175  Higher 
protection for employees has generally been blamed for the so-called labour market rigidities.176 I 
can only respectfully disagree with this earlier point when it comes to competition policy 
intervention; the latter has rarely tackled issues surrounding inequality for the poor. However, it did 
so for the rich when the previous Commission injected billions of euros of state aid into banks, which 
were deemed to be too big to fail rather than exit the market due to poor performance and 
management alike.177  
Ultimately, the historical analysis of the inception of the merger control rules reveals that the late 
introduction of these rules was due to the lack of consensus over the pursuit of non-economic 
criteria in the assessment of mergers, in particular, the legal balancing of employment or other 
industrial policy considerations. 178  There was then a concern that the politicisation of merger 
control would179 happen in the following years.180 It can still be argued that the silence with regard 
to jobs or unemployment in the Merger Regulation should be properly acknowledged and that the 
legal balancing should not be based exclusively on industrial organization ‘efficiency’ criteria 
without any further consideration of the social impact of the proposed merger.  
Nonetheless, the present state of the law is very clear in the sense that competition law does not 
apply to labour relations. The considerations are based strictly on the special regulation of 
employment contracts. For example, a collective labour agreement that set minimum fees for the 
                                                          
174 See Vicente Navarro and John Schmitt, ‘Economic Efficiency versus Social Equality? The U.S. Liberal Model versus the European 
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175 Ibid. 614. 
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supply of independent services could not be challenged as anti-competitive under Article 101 
TFEU.181  
From the interpretation of the available data on new jobs and cuts following a merger, it can be 
concluded that the assumption that ‘new jobs replace old jobs’ is a fallacy, with the exception of 
losses that could be justifiable due to technological change.182 It is, however, beyond the scope of this 
contribution to offer recommendations to economists183 as to the optimal trade-off between price and 
wage efficiency that should be pursued. It is obvious that it would not be desirable to replace ‘higher’ 
with ‘lower’ wages to the extent to which this strategy results in unwanted social dumping of ‘older’ 
and experienced workers to be replaced with ‘cheaper’ ones. Obviously, ‘full employment’ is 
incompatible with egocentric individuals who are solely after very high wages.  
 
VI. The Macroeconomics of Wage Efficiency  
It is advanced that the disciplinary division between micro- and macroeconomics has contributed to 
the lack of a coordinated implementation of a competition policy that could actively seek to achieve 
both productivity and jobs. Having set lower prices as a target, competition policy has sought to 
achieve both ‘price’ and ‘wage’ efficiency by cutting down labour costs and hurting wages. In 
contrast, full employment translates into making more jobs available, and, at the same time, by 
maintaining the wages at a lower level than under fierce or aggressive competition for jobs, it 
creates stable market conditions for lower labour costs. And lower labour costs contribute directly 
to lower prices for goods and services. 
As has been argued elsewhere,184 in a highly competitive EU labour market, a lower wage will not 
attract many workers, so employers will have to offer other employees a higher wage. As businesses 
have no interest in raising their own labour costs, inducing unemployment will be seen as positive, 
as it pushes wages further down. The perils of high unemployment are the existence of fierce 
competition for jobs with a high demand for jobs and a lower level of offers.  
However, there is an illusion of real wages that are higher than these wages would have been 
during times of lower unemployment with normal competition for jobs, i.e., lower demand and 
higher numbers of offers. The argument that fierce competition for jobs rewards employees with 
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higher wages is yet another fallacy. Employers could easily divest themselves of higher paid 
employees and reduce labour costs by hiring younger talent. This phenomenon was also captured by 
Advocate-General Wahl, who exposed the perils of social dumping by saying that this ‘might occur 
through the immediate dismissal of workers or through gradual economisation by not replacing 
workers whose contract has come to an end’.185 In a nutshell, unemployment is the root of the 
problem, but not the solution.  
Advocate General Wahl also referred to how ‘the elimination of wage competition between 
workers – which is in itself the very raison d’être for collective bargaining – implies that an 
employer can under no circumstances hire other workers for a salary below that set out in the 
collective agreement’. 186  He went on to ask the following self-revealing question: ‘How could 
workers credibly ask for a salary increase if they knew that they could be easily and promptly 
replaced with self-employed persons who would probably do the same job for a lower 
remuneration?’187 Similar to the scenario mentioned above, ‘wage efficiency’ cannot be taken to 
represent the real, but rather an artificial wage since a larger percentage of the active workforce is 
never fully employed. 
As a preliminary finding, this contribution has identified that the current rhetoric found in 
mainstream micro-and macroeconomic textbooks is in sharp contrast to real-life scenarios: first, jobs 
are restructured at a higher rate than they are being created, and, second, higher unemployment 
creates only an impression of higher real wages than those possibly available under full employment, 
i.e., perfect labour competition. 
 
VII. The Macroeconomic Outlook of ‘Full’ Employment: Are We Anywhere Near? 
Over the years, the statistics offered by Eurostat have raised several concerns over unemployment 
figures, which, from a total of 513 million EU citizens in January 2018,188 amounted to an overall 
15.7 million and 8.2% of the total workforce by the end of 2016. In 2018, the unemployment 
situation has slightly improved with an overall 17.105 million in the EU28 and 13.570 million in the 
Eurozone area.189 
Year Unemployed in EU-28 Unemployment rate as a 
percentage of the total 
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workforce 
2000s 20.5 million 9.2% 
End of 2004 21.2 million 9.2% 
2005s 16.2 million 6.8% 
2008-mid-2010 21.9 million 9.7% 
2001-2013 26.5 million 11% 
End of 2016 15.7 million 8.2% 
End of July 2018 17.1 million 6.9% 
A few Member States, namely, Germany (4.3%), the Czech Republic (4.5%), and the UK (5.0%), were 
in full employment as of January 2016, while the remaining Member States displayed higher 
unemployment, with the worst conditions clearly evidenced in Spain (20.4%) and Greece (24%).190 In 
2018, the lowest unemployment rates were recorded in the Czech Republic (2.4%) and Germany 
(3.4%) whilst the highest unemployment rates remain in Greece (20.2%) and Spain (15.2%). 
 
Looking at the wider picture from 2004 to 2015, Germany had a higher level of unemployment in 
the period from 2004 to 2010, fluctuating from 11.2% in 2005 to 7.0% in 2010, but it addressed the 
issue, moving towards full employment from 2011 with 5.8%, and effectively reaching full 
employment at 4.6% in 2015. In contrast, the UK was in a better position, as it had full employment 
in the period from 2004 to 2008 with fluctuations from the lowest level of 4.7% in 2004 to 5.8% in 
2008 and had relatively higher levels of unemployment in the following period from 8.1% in 2010 to 
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6.1% in 2014, reaching 5.3% in 2015. The UK’s situation is comparable with that of the US in the 
sense that higher levels of unemployment dominated the years of the financial crisis from 2009 to 
2013 with relatively higher levels of unemployment, which reached a peak of 9.6% in 2010, but it has 
been moving slowly towards full employment in the last three years (5.3% in 2015). 
 
 
Taking into account the existing disparities in the economic development throughout the EU, the 
target of full employment has still not been met since 2004, but the situation looks more promising 
than ever before in 2018 with 6.9%. By 2020, the Union should most likely reach its outstanding 
social goal of full employment. As can be seen from the above table, it had historically been the case 
that the EU unemployment figures stagnated around 9%. In fact, the average unemployment rate for 
the period from 2004 to 2015 was 9.16% and was only slightly higher in the Eurozone area at 9.81%. 
In contrast, in the US, the target has been met with the exception of the financial crisis period, when 
from 2009 to 2013, the average unemployment rate stood at 8.66%.  
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A. An Optimistic Scenario 
Are there any signs of recovery? The above figures would suggest that, based on the top performing 
economies of the UK and Germany, the full employment target was met in 2015 in Germany (4.6%), 
and more than met (3.4%) in 2018, while it was nearly met in the UK and the US (5.3%), but more 
than met in the US (4%) and in the UK (4.2) in 2018.191 Critics can contradict an exaggerated 
optimism, as the target has seen some improvement from 9.4% for the EU28 and 10.9% in the 
Eurozone in 2016 to 6.9% in the EU28 and 8.3% in the Eurozone in 2018. 
However, exaggerated pessimism is equally inappropiate, given that these figures represent an 
average of 28 Member States, which included two severely depressed economies, i.e., Greece (24.5%) 
and Spain (22.1%), as well as the worst performing economies, including France (16.3%), Croatia 
(16.3%), Cyprus (15%), and Portugal (12.6). From the former Eastern European block, with 6.8%, 
Romania outperformed two Nordic states, Sweden (7.4%) and Finland (9.4%), at job creation.  
B. A Downgraded ‘Optimistic Scenario’ Due to Brexit 
                                                          




Given the UK’s decision to exit the EU, and its imminent departure by March 2019,192 there might 
be further signs of optimism for mainland Europe should major international corporations re-locate 
there and, as a result of the emergence of social dumping in the UK, bring an influx of jobs and 
address the present imbalance in certain EU Member States. Therefore, a ‘hard’ exit could bring a 
grey prospect and make it impossible for the UK to maintain its already met target of full 
employment (4.2%).  
Indeed, ‘Brexit’ could soften the EU’s overall unemployment rate through some newly ‘gained’ 
jobs from elsewhere. However, a ‘hard’ exit could also have a negative effect on the EU27 by 
destroying some of its existing jobs and by losing its present status quo of nearly full employment 
(6.9%). After years of hard work, and being so close to reaching the social goal of full employment 
(1.9%), this could be lost because of a macroeconomic event such as a ‘hard’ Brexit. 
C. A Parable about Brexit? 
These days, one could compare the ubiquity of the ‘Brexit talk’, i.e., a community of people that 
consume ‘Brexit’ daily, after being misled about ‘Brexit’ before it became an end-product, with 
Keynes’ famous parable to the Macmillan committee: ‘Let us suppose a community which owns 
nothing but banana plantations which they labour to cultivate. They produce bananas, they consume 
bananas, and nothing else’ (…).193 What they do not spend on bananas, they save and the investment 
in the production of bananas exactly equals this saving. ‘Into this Eden, there enters a thrift 
campaign urging the members of the public to abate their improvident practice of spending nearly 
all their current incomes on buying bananas for food. “You have no provision for your old age; save 
more money” ’.194 In Keynes’ parable, because the community turns to saving, this reduces the 
amount that people will pay for bananas. However, what remains to be seen is how efficient ‘Brexit’ 
actually is as an end-product, i.e., its final cost to the community; the level of employment generated 
by the demand for ‘Brexit’ and, what is currently unknown, how successful ‘Brexit’ will be if the 
whole community decided to save time, as the most precious human resource of their lifetime, and 
switch off from ‘Brexit’ entirely. Except for producers who will, then, buy ‘Brexit’? 
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‹https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/ld201719/ldselect/ldeucom/67/67.pdf›; cf Anca D Chirita, Written Evidence to the House of 
Lords (14 September 2017) 
‹http://data.parliament.uk/writtenevidence/committeeevidence.svc/evidencedocument/eu-internal-market-subcommittee/brexit-
competition/written/70117.html›, on the need to maintain the principle of consistent interpretation of EU competition law; for the 
governmental response to the House of Lords’ Inquiry, see, e.g., Department for Business, Energy & Industrial Strategy, ‘Government 
Response to the House of Lords EU Internal Market Sub-Committee Report on the Impact of Brexit on UK Competition and State Aid’ 
(29 March 2018), ‹https://www.parliament.uk/documents/lords-committees/eu-internal-market-subcommittee/brexit-
competition/290318-Government-Response-to-HoL-EU-Internal-Market-Sub-Committee-competition.pdf›. 
193 For direct references to Keynes’ parable, see, e.g., Peter Temin and David Vines, The Leaderless Economy: Why the World Economic System 
Fell Apart and How to Fix It (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2013), 72; Peter Clarke, Keynes: The Twentieth Century’s Most Influential 
Economist (London: Bloomsbury Publishing, 2009), 141. Beyond this expository parable, Keynes is famous inter alia for his burlesque 
language, for example, where ‘animal spirits’ denote entrepreneurs. 
194 Ibid. 
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D. A Possible Solution, not Illusions: Saying ‘No’ to Social Dumping, and, hopefully, to 
Brexit, Too 
The present picture demonstrates that the EU has not yet successfully delivered on its social market 
economy promise, as it created and maintained clusters of job opportunities in the most influential 
Member States, which have traditionally been seen as open to economic migration and social 
dumping. Therefore, the EU must learn its lesson the hard way. Taking the UK as an example, the 
level of economic development has been uneven, with record numbers of jobs being created in the 
city of London and fewer opportunities in the rest of the country. Making access to jobs evenly 
spread throughout the Union could also have reduced the burden of economic migration on public 
services and prevented the existence of top and bottom performers.  
One could also argue that the UK has been the victim of its own economic success and the 
influential status it has achieved inside the EU during its forty-five years of membership, as while it 
has been incapable of re-distributing these economic benefits within the UK, it has been unwilling to 
pass on some of these opportunities to other Member States. There is no active economic migration 
in the absence of full employment: create unemployment, and all talented workers will leave the 
economy while productivity stagnates. 
In conclusion, competition policy should actively focus on the delivery of new jobs instead of 
being blindly focused on economic efficiency. This does not mean tolerating inefficient firms; rather, 
it means asking those firms to redistribute a higher percentage of their corporate profits towards 
creating new jobs and maintaining existing ones where firms decide to merge.  
 
VIII. Conclusion  
This contribution has sought to close the gap between the perfect competition theoretical ideal of 
price and wage efficiency by de-constructing the meaning of economic efficiency from both a micro- 
and a macroeconomics perspective. As a real-life scenario, the case of mergers and acquisitions has 
been used to illustrate how the reality of newly created jobs is not on a par with job losses. In the 
context of mergers, this contribution has identified the need for a major overhaul of the efficiency 
defence with the aim of focusing more actively on job creation, or at least on balancing the number 
of job cuts with the number of newly created jobs. 
Ultimately, this contribution arrives at the conclusion that the theoretical ideal of wage efficiency 
is not one that aspires to very high wages associated with higher levels of unemployment, but one 
that seeks to actively address the issue of full employment. The latter will enhance the working 
conditions of the employed workers, although it also offers the opportunity for wages to be pushed 
further down. In this respect, a viable alternative has to be a pragmatic balance between fierce and 
aggressive competition (higher wages) and little or no competition (lower wages). A highly 
competitive social market economy cannot be successful in delivering the desired market outcome of 
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full employment if the foundations of microeconomics are not set up to actively encourage the 
creation of new jobs. 
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